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DIALOGUE

OCTOBER, 1978

MARXISM AND BEHAVIORISM: IDEOLOGICAL PARALLELS
Stephen Foster
Western Michigan University
Marxism, as a philosophical system,
attempts to provide an accurate analysis of man and his social institutions. Behaviorism, as a system of psychology, claims that its method is
fundamental to an understanding of
human nature. Both systems justify
their claims on the grounds that they
are employing methods which are scientific in character. Marxism bases its
method on historical analysis, maintaining that history unfolds in an orderly,
predictable manner and that a proper
analysis of it reveals scientific laws.
The general methodology of the natural sciences is the model for behaviorism. Behaviorists point to the successes
of the natural sciences and claim that
they employ the scientific method thoroughly and more consistently than any
previous or current psychology. Moreover, they claim that behavioristic psychology has been mindful of and faithful to the scientific goals of predictability and control of the subject matter
and has advanced the study of human
psychology to the extent that it can
call itself objective and genuinely scientific.
My use of the term "Marxism" in
this paper will refer to the thought and
writings of Karl Marx and Fredrich
Engels. I will take B. F. Skinner to be
the principal representative of behaviorism. It is my contention that both
Marxism and behaviorism as complete
views of man (which they both claim
to be) are forms of dogmatic ideology.
I take the term "ideology" generally as
the Oxford English Dictionary defines
it "ideal or abstract speculation; in a
deprecatory sense, unpractical or visionary theorizing or speculation." I would
emphasize the term "visionary" in this
definition and apply it to both Marxism
and behaviorism to emphasize the fact
that both systems extend their visions

into political programs, that is, both
envisage their systems as potential social systems which vastly improve human conditions.
I take the term "ideology" specifically to apply to a system of thought in
which the political dimension is connected to the whole system in such a
way that it serves as a moral postulate
for the entire system and, in effect,
closes it off such that to question the
presuppositions is to betray vital moralpolitical purpose. While this characterization has long been conceded by many
to be true of Marxism (we frequently
hear of Marxist ideology) it has not
been widely extended to the system of
behaviorism. Yet I believe that behaviorism suffers from a similar flaw, one
in which a methodological rigidity is
tied to a social theory and as a consequence inhibits the development of
creative intellectual activity.
I propose to examine Marxist and
behaviorist thinking and draw what I
think are significant parallels. I shall
do this by developing three separate
points:
(I) Marxism and behaviorism as
sciences
(II) Marxism and behaviorism as
social philosophies
(III) Marxism and behaviorism as
ideologies.
I
Marxism claims to apply a scientific
method to the study of social phenomena. The method employed is one developed by Hegel, who attempted to
account for human social development
by interpreting it to a process of dialectical assent. He believed that the
natural world, including human society, was a phenomenal manifestation
out of which the Ideal (the rational
essence of reality) develops to a state
of perfect self-realization through a se1
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comes to see his efforts as a genuine
contribution to the study of human affairs, a contribution which takes the
form of an objective social science.
"These two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of history, and the
capitalistic production through surplus
value, we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism becomes a science."5
Modern physical science is the major
source of inspiration for behaviorism.
Its advocates point to the advances in
the physical sciences and claim that its
method applied to human behavior can
yield similar progress. Concomitant with
this desire to emulate the methods of
the physical sciences is a rejection of
psychology prior to behaviorism as being laden with vague metaphysical
terminology. I refer to B. F. Skinner's
book, Behavior of Organisms, 1938. In
this work Skinner registers his dissatisfaction with the progress of psychology.
Riddled with imprecise and subjective
terminology, dominated by burdensome theoretical constructions, psychology for Skinner requires a method
which is free from obscurantist and introspective accounts of human behavior.
There is a striking parallel between
Skinner's concept of the efficiency and
economy of his method and Marx's
view of his own method. Both are concerned to rid their inquiries of excess
speculative, theoretical baggage. In the
German Ideology Marx makes this
claim the premise of the materialist
conception of history:

ries of contradictions whose resolutions
advance the development and status of
the Ideal to its perfect state.1
Marx adopted this method and modified it. He criticized Hegel for abstracting the content out of his philosophy,
attempting to account for reality in a
wholly abstract fashion, imputing content and meaning to a purely ideational realm while failing to recognize the
substance and effect of material reality.2
Marx and Engels applied Hegel's
method to social-economic history. They
were convinced that the real content
of history was located in economic development and that this development
took place in the form of class struggle:
It was seen that all past history with the
exception of its primitive stages, was the
history of class struggles: that these warring classes are always products of the
modes of production and exchange, in a
word, of the economic conditions of their
time; that the economic structure of society
always furnishes the real basis starting from
which we can alone work out the ultimate
explanation of the whole superstructure of
judicial and political institutions as well
as of the religious, philosophical and other
ideas of a given historical period.3
The science of man for Marx and Engels is economics interpreted in an historical context. This science provides,
they maintain, what we today expect
from any legitimate scientific discipline, predictability. Human history is
subject to the rule of laws as is the
natural material world. "He (Darwin)
dealt the metaphysical conception of
nature the heaviest blow by his proof
that all organic beings, plants, animals
and man himself are products of a process of evolution going on through millions of years."4 A study of history reveals the social economic laws to which
mankind is subject. Thus the future
course of human social events can be
charted and predicted once the historical laws are understood. Marx

The premises from which we begin are not
arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstractions can only be
made in the imagination. They are the real
individuals, their activity and the material
conditions of their life, both those which
they find already existing and those by
their activity. These premises can thus be
verified in a purely empirical way.6
Skinner in his description of the inception of modern behavioral science
2
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sees its advance as contingent upon its
ability to displace methods which resort to explaining behavior by some
cause or process anterior to behavior.
"When a science of behavior had once
rid itself of psychic fictions: either it
might leave their places empty and
proceed to deal with its data directly,
or it might make replacements,"7 Empirical data is Skinner's tool. ''There
is only one way to obtain a convenient
and useful system and that is to go directly to the data." 8
Both Marx and Skinner are striving
for an objective approach to their respective subject matters in order to
yield empirically verifiable laws which
can be used to predict and control the
course of human affairs. They take
positions of primary materialism, that
is, they reject any attempt to account
for any human phenomenon by appealing to any concept of mind. Marx's
dialectical materialism replaces German
metaphysical idealism, Skinner's scientific materialism replaces the mind-matter dualism presupposed by such prominent predecessors as Freud and James.
In both Marxism and behaviorism
man's role becomes that of interpreter
of the forces that shape him. This is
accomplished by analyzing the disposition and dynamics of material forces.
For Skinner: "The task of a scientific
analysis is to explain how the behavior
of a person as a physical system is related to conditions under which this individual lives."9 For Marx: "The first
premise of all human history is, of
course, the existence of living human
individuals. Thus the first fact to be
established is the physical organization
of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature." 10

This view, however, has a significant
political implication. Scientific understanding provides the possibility of prediction and control and thus leads to a
technology of human affairs. This technology in Marxist terms is a revolutionary activity, in Skinnerian terms a behavioral technology. The scientific objective detachment of Marx and Skinner is linked to social-political commitment. Indeed, the social goals are
the ultimate justifications for both systems.
To conclude: there are three factors
which inhere in Marxism and behaviorism which makes the systems parallel
in their claims for scientific objectivity.
First, both view their methods as being
scientific, dealing with strict empirical
data and shunning speculation. Second,
they both see man as an interperter of
himself as a strict physical-material entity: and third, they both view their
systems as alternatives to outmoded
and benighted idealistic or mentalistic
conceptual schemes.
II
In the first section I mentioned the
technological implications of the two
systems as being the most effective instruments of social change. The impetus here is a kind of moral-social
idealism, a realization of the vast disparity between man as he is and man
as he could be, and a revulsion from
the spectacle of human destructiveness
and the institutionalization of greed
and exploitation.
Genuine knowledge provides man
the opportunity to divest himself of
the ugly and brutal conditions which
have so long determined the lives of
so many. Marxism and behaviorism are
prescriptive in disposition. Both claim
an absolute right to be believed, that
is, they both see their programs as
being absolutely essential in order to
bring about an improved social order
and they both see their detractors as
obscurantists or sentimentalists. Skin-

These two quotes illustrate a similarity in what Marx and Skinner conceive
to be the object and purpose of their
study. Both men consider themselves
as scientists, as objective interpreters
of the natural order, eschewing mystification of man's relation to nature.
3
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ner's view is that the development of
"behavioral technology" is the best
guarantee of avoiding massive social
upheaval:

for the first time man, in a certain sense is
finally marked off from the rest of the
animal kingdom and emerges from mere
animal conditions into really human ones.13

A behavioral technology comparable in
power and precision to physical and biological technology is lacking, and those
who do not find the possibility ridiculous
are more likely to be frightened by it than
reassured. That is how far we are from
preventing the catastrophe toward which
the world seems to be inexorably moving.11

This kind of human ideal described
above by Engels is to a large extent
shaped by the concept of human perfectability. Human perfeetability is, of
course, one of the overriding themes
of the Enlightenment. "Our hopes for
the future condition of the human race
can be subsumed under three important heads; the abolition of inequality
between nations, the progress of equality within each nation, and the true
perfection of mankind."14
Marx grew up very much under the
influence of Enlightenment ideals.15 He
inherited the optimistic view of eighteenth century thinkers such as Condorcet who believed that the gradual
advance of the human mind by means
of science and art over superstition
and ignorance would eventually liberate the human race from the evils of
tyranny, injustice and war. This view,
which essentially equated vice with ignorance, exalted the capabilities of the
mind and interpreted moral social evils
to be temporary obstructions which
would yield to the forces of scientific
advancement. Marx's social analysis
produces a more insightful and realistic
explanation of social change. He is
aware of the non-rational economic
and political forces which create inequities and of the pressures and tensions which arise when various groups
compete for social and economic power. Yet he shares with Enlightenment
thinkers the optimism of the outcome
of this competition. His belief is that
man can extend his mastery of the
natural physical world to his own social world and in effect liberate himself
from all the evils which have frustrated
the complete realization of his humanitySkinner's views are also much effected by the concept of human perfectability. The very title of his book

Marx is not quite as gloomv. He doesn't
see the world as moving inexplorably
toward catastrophe, yet in his own time
he foresaw a massive class struggle,
one in which the proletariat, the exploited class of propertyless laborers
would seize social power from the
propertied capitalist exploiters.12 Marx's
view of history is pervaded with moral
indignation. In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts Marx describes the
social and economic conditions which
lead to the dehumanization of working
class people. His work is not only a
critical social analysis but is also a moral
indictment of a social system which
he believes is based upon ruthless exploitation and greed.
The implicit moral idealism in Marxism and behaviorism identifies the
causes of social evil as being due to external environmental imbalances which
are aggravated by man's own ignorance
of their existence and perpetuated by
his misconception of himself as a selfdetermined agent of social change.
Once however, he has perfected the
tools of social analysis and developed
a human engineering science, the conditions which threaten his well-being
can be eliminated. With Marx, for example, a reorganization of the means
of production brings this about:
With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities
is done away with, and simultaneously, the
master of product over producer . . . then
4
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will be realized when man acknowledges his being acted upon and shaped
by the material world and also acknowledges that by rearranging material conditions (for Marx, the termination of
commodity production, for Skinner, a
more consistent system of distributing
pleasure and pain) a better world will
come into existence.
To conclude: both Marxism and behaviorism envision an improved society
which can be realized once man recognizes his stature as a material being,
determined by the same processes that
shape the rest of the world; and subjects his social world to an administration which reorders existing institutions
and implements programs in light of
man's material determination by natural
laws. In effect, both Marxism and behaviorism offer man the opportunity
to perfect himself, to realize his positive potentialities in a society which
has effectively eradicated the unwanted and unwholesome side of his nature.

Beyond Freedom and Dignity is a reflection of his view that concepts such
as freedom and dignity are vestiges of
a false and metaphysical view of human autonomy, a view he believes frustrates attempts to implement methods
and practices by which men can rid
themselves of social evils. "A scientific
analysis of behavior dispossesses autonomous man and turns the control he
has said to exert over to the environment."16 Once man abandons his tenacious but misguided commitment to
the illusion of his autonomy he gains
a previously unparalleled dimension of
control over his own activity, a control
which enables him to eradicate the
sources of social evil. Indeed it is the
concept of morality itself which has
impeded the process of human perfection because the institution of morality presupposes a degree of personal
responsibility and individual autonomy,
a false presupposition which, for Skinner, results in a failure to examine and
understand the true causes of human
behavior and consequently results in a
failure to remedy basic human maladies. Skinner's ultimate purpose in this
respect is to formulate all human problems into technological problems. Then
man can establish a process of identifying causal relations of human behavior to antisocial and destructive activities and a technique of adjusting
those causes to obtain an extinction of
the unwanted behavior. The domain of
human affairs which has been traditionally considered ethical is thus transformed into a strict scientific one and
thus man, in effect, delivers himself
without obstacle to his own scrutiny,
which is capable of identifying and
eliminating his own imperfections.

III
Marxism and behaviorism are theories of human nature. But unlike some
theories of human nature, for example,
stoicism, Thomism, or psychoanalysis,
both Marxism and behaviorism require
a social-political implementation of
their theories. In order for there to be
a better world, a socialist economic
order, or a behaviorist technocracy
must be brought into existence. In both
cases there is the assumption that the
quality of human social experience will
be significantly improved because social
institutions will be based on the recognition and satisfaction of genuine human needs and these institutions will
be more knowledgeably and efficiently
administered. For Marx, the new society eliminates the institution of private property, an institution he believes
is responsible for creating dehumanized
social relations. Its existence requires
that persons treat each other as objects,
as commodities to be used and possessed:

Skinner's proposed transformation of
morality into technology is very much
analogous to Marx's vision of the withering away of the state once the productive capacities of society have been
transformed. Implicit in both views is
the idea that the greatest human goods
5
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our institutions are at best meager,
provisional successes, and at worst dismal unmitigated failures.

Private property has made us so stupid
and one sided that an object is only ours
when we have it, when it exists for us as
capital or when we directly possess, eat,
drink, wear, inhabit it, etc., in short when
we use it.17

The widespread utilization of a science of human behavior by a society,
claims Skinner, greatly increases the
likelihood that its various social endeavors will be much more successful.
What exactly is his measure of success? The successful realization of institutional goals. But what about more
general, intangible goals? Skinner's
general standard of success is survival.
He draws a cultural analogy to physical
evolution. Social practices which survive are evidence of success. "A scientific analysis may lead us to resist the
more immediate blandishments of freedom, justice, knowledge or happiness
in considering the long run consequences of survival."20 One can't help
but wonder what interest a society
would have in surviving without these
"blandishments."

Private property extends the concept
and practice of "using" to the ultimate
sphere of human relations so that men
cease to exist as creatures with any genuine content or value in themselves.
Marx believes that if a society can be
created in which the goal of "possessing
things" can be eliminated then people
will treat each other in an intelligent,
compassionate, and humane way instead of exploiting and degrading one
another.
Skinner's program for improving the
quality of social experience involves the
design of a science of human behavior.
Advances in this science mean that social affairs can be subject to a much
greater degree of rational management
and control. When the power to predict and control is substantial and well
organized then undesirable and destructive elements can be eliminated. In his
book Science and Human Behavior
Skinner proposes that the experimental
method of the physical sciences be extended to the domain of human society. In fact he sees society itself as a
type of experiment. "A given culture
is, in short, an experiment in behavior."18 Society is analogously, a laboratory in which the institutions are
designed to elicit the kind of social
behavior that advances the standing of
the institution. Skinner defines government as, "the power to punish" and
law as, "statement of contingency reinforcement."19 Government and its constituent agencies thus secure compliance to their rules by administering a
very complex system of punishments
and rewards. Thus the situation becomes one in which institutions are
highly successful in realizing their ends,
unlike our present situation, in which

The aim of both Skinner and Marx
is the institution of a society relatively
free of exploitation and destructiveness,
and absolutely committed to creative
and cooperative endeavors. Both, however, share what I believe is a conceptual flaw which permits their genuinely useful insights to be contaminated
by substantial dogmatism. The flaw, I
think, lies in their mutual disparagement of the theoretical dimension of
intellectual activity. With Marx this
disparagement manifests itself in a repudiation of philosophy itself. His rejection of philosophy, particularly German philosophy, arose from his conviction that its preoccupation with ideas
betrayed commitment to the problems
of the material world.
Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the
products of consciousness, to which they
attribute an independent existence, as the
real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declare them the true bonds of human society), it is evident that the Young
6
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Hegelians have to fight only against these
illusions of consciousness . . . they forget,
however, that they themselves are opposing
nothing but phrases to these phrases, and
that they are in no way combating the real
existing world when they are combating
solely the phrases of this world.21

the major problem is to break it into
simple, manageable, and measurable
analytic units. These analytic units become the clear unquestionable building blocks of scientific explanation.
Theory then is superfluous and adds
only what must ultimately be discarded.

Skinner's opposition to theory takes
form in his delineation of the procedure of scientific explanation. His
aim is to formulate scientific explanation so that it is free from terms which
cannot be operationally defined. Theory, for Skinner, means a set of lawfully connected statements and not an
abstracted conceptual construction. "He
(Skinner) criticizes the construction, in
psychological theories, of causal chains
in which a first link consisting of an observable and controllable event is connected with a final ('third') one of the
same kind by an intermediate link which
usually is not open to observation and
control."22 A scientifically constructed
explanation of a given phenomena thus
ought to utilize terms which can be
translated into direct observational data.
"A reflex is not, of course, a theory.
It is a fact. It is an analytical unit
which makes an investigation of behavior possible."23 The methodological
goal is reduction. The further an explanation is from expression in sensory
units the more likely it is to be laden
with terms representing entities, qualities or relations which can neither be
measured nor confirmed and thus the
explanation becomes an abstraction
from real analyzable quantities into less
real unanalyzable qualities.

This is the point where Skinner's
work is most vulnerable to ideological
degeneration. The reaction against theory and against speculation and imagination and the exaltation of practice
over theory, grossly inhibits the influx
of new ideas. That raw sense data supplies certainty is a philosophical assertion that involves a number of difficult
and complex epistemological and metapsychological problems such as the ontological status of perceptions and their
determination in time and space. To
downgrade the role of theory in scientific explanations is to deprive the enterprise of opportunities for growth and
development. Theory is needed for new
and imaginative systematization of data,
and the offering of fertile hypothesis
which suggest new interpretations.
"Theoretical terms cannot be replaced
without serious loss by formulations in
terms of observables only."24
The parallel between Marx's disparagement of philosophy and Skinner's
rejection of theoretical constructs points
to a similar ontological view that reality is ultimately material, and that
thought itself is a material activity.
Thus it is matter and not ideas which
determines the content and direction
of human endeavor. Since it is matter
which determines ideas and not the
reverse, the political implication is that
society should structure its institutions
so that the people are related to the
material world in a way which satisfies
basic needs and impulses. And since
ideas are the outcome of this system,
there is a tendency to measure them
as consistent or inconsistent with the
social design. Those ideas which contradict the ends of the system are con-

One of the weaknesses of this view
is the fact that it easily degenerates
into an overly mechanistic construction which fails to account for the creative and innovative aspects of human
experience. Theoretical constructions
serve as tools, as instruments to generate new interpretations of factual data.
For Skinner it is as though raw sense
data is simply there for the asking and
7
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sidered to be not only false, but pernicious and destructive. Truth then,
becomes a standard of ideological purity and the intellectual virtues of honesty, clarity and creativity are overriden by the social requirements of loyalty and conformity. Thus, as I stated
at the beginning of this paper, Marxism and behaviorism are dominated by
a moralism that arises out of their re-

spective conceptions of the relation of
the mind and thought to the other
aspects of human experience, a moralism which takes it justification by the
contention that human society is perfectible and that the readjustment of
social institutions will bring about this
perfection by eliminating destructiveness and exploitation,
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